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Articles 
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION AS CHILD 
TRAFFICKING 
David M. Smolin* 
When is intercountry adoption a form of child trafficking?  The 
purpose of this Article is to attempt to answer this question, particularly 
from the perspective of international law.  As it turns out, the answer is 
surprisingly obscure.  Thus, a second purpose of this Article is to explain 
why a question so central to the ethical and legal legitimacy of 
intercountry adoption is so difficult to answer. 
Part I of this Article explores some of the ideological and ethical 
dilemmas that initially make it difficult to distinguish intercountry 
adoption from child trafficking, and argues that an exploration of legal 
standards may represent a way out of the ideological impasse.  Part II 
explores in some detail the question of when abusive adoption practices 
constitute illicit child trafficking under international law.  Part II.A 
discusses the development of the international law of trafficking from its 
roots in anti-slavery conventions.  It is particularly significant that the 
law has often refused to define the mere sale of a person as a form of 
trafficking; instead, the law has defined illicit trafficking to require some 
form of exploitation beyond sale, such as enslavement, sexual 
exploitation, or exploitative labor.  Part II.B discusses contemporary 
international law documents which specifically address abusive 
                                                 
*  Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University.  I would like to thank 
Miriam Cherry, Brannon Denning, and Desiree Smolin for their review of, and comments 
on, earlier versions of this Article.  I also benefited from the comments of a number of 
Cumberland Law School colleagues at a faculty colloquium presentation of this paper.  In 
addition, I wish to thank three Cumberland students, Vickie Willard, Ashley Mims, and 
Ken Scheinert, for their research assistance.  Finally, it has become traditional for members 
of the adoption triad writing about adoption to note their personal experience with 
adoption; in this regard, it may be relevant that my wife and I are parents of older, 
internationally adopted children.  Under these circumstances, I particularly wish to thank 
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adoption practices as a form of trafficking.  The recent movement of 
international law to address abusive adoption practices as a form of illicit 
traffic or child selling is cautious and incomplete.  Initially, it appeared 
that at least some abusive adoption practices involving the transfer of 
children for financial consideration had been clearly condemned as a 
form of illicit child selling or child trafficking.  However, a closer 
analysis of these provisions, in the context of both domestic and 
intercountry adoption, reveals that their prohibitions of abusive 
adoption practices as trafficking are largely illusory and ineffective.  The 
law and practice regarding money and adoption turn out to be so mired 
in legal fictions and regulatory gaps as to make it extraordinarily 
difficult to distinguish between licit and illicit payments.  The law of 
both domestic and intercountry adoption systems are compromised in 
their capacity to prohibit abusive adoption practices, because they have 
habitually permitted market behavior to predominate, while excusing 
such behavior through legal fictions. 
The Conclusion compares Judge Richard Posner’s use of verbal 
formulas in defending his famous market approach to adoption, with the 
use of similar verbal formulas in the law.  These verbal formulas repeat 
the law’s earlier reluctance to define the sale of a person as a form of 
illicit trafficking, absent some further enslavement or exploitation of the 
person.  The Conclusion suggests that the law uses verbal formulas and 
legal fictions to implicitly permit what Judge Posner so controversially 
advocated, the creation of an adoption market in children.  Under these 
circumstances, it turns out that the actual practices of intercountry 
adoption are, in systemic forms, a form of child selling or child 
trafficking.  This is not to say that every individual adoption is illicit or 
unethical, but rather that the adoption system has become so intertwined 
with market behavior as to, in theory and practice, frequently permit 
child selling as a form of adoption.  While some of the most important 
sending nations are generally free of child trafficking within their 
adoption systems, the adoption systems of a significant number of 
sending nations have been seriously impacted by abusive practices 
related to money and the transfer of children.  This Article concludes that 
unless significant reforms are adopted, intercountry adoption will 
eventually be abolished with history judging it as another form of 
exploitation.  Therefore, even assuming that intercountry adoption is not 
inherently exploitative or a form of child trafficking, it will be judged 
such, because the legal system and adoption practice have permitted 
intercountry adoption to operate as a market in human beings.   
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I.  WHY IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH CHILD TRAFFICKING FROM 
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION:  PROBLEMS OF IDEOLOGY AND ETHICS 
The association of child trafficking with intercountry adoption will 
likely strike some readers as obvious, others as offensive.  To some, 
intercountry adoption in itself is more or less a form of child trafficking, 
as it involves the transfer of children from poor nations to rich nations in 
order to meet the demand of those in rich nations for children.  The fact 
that those seeking to adopt want daughters and sons, not sex or labor, 
seems to make little difference for those most ideologically opposed to 
intercountry adoption.  In broad terms, it is still a matter of the citizens 
of rich countries using their wealth and power to “buy” the vulnerable 
children of the poor.  From this perspective, those who really care about 
the suffering of children in developing nations should provide assistance 
and help to children within their own societies, rather than spending 
inordinate sums to strip children of their national identity, native 
culture, and language.   
By contrast, those most supportive of intercountry adoption perceive 
literally millions of children in need of intercountry adoption in 
developing and transition economy nations.  Children abandoned, 
killed, left in dismal orphanages, or living on the streets bear horrific 
testimony to the pressing need for adoption.  From this perspective, 
ethical or political objections to intercountry adoption lack legitimacy, 
since they sacrifice the concrete good of children to ideological idols.1   
These sharply conflicting views of intercountry adoption engender 
confusion.  When one group views intercountry adoption as a form of 
child trafficking, while another views intercountry adoption as a 
beautiful act of compassion, the actual operation of our system of 
intercountry adoption becomes obscured.  Continuing the ideological 
debate over whether intercountry adoption is inherently good or evil is a 
fool’s errand, like so many other ideological debates leading further and 
further afield into conflicting worldviews.  The resolution of such 
worldview conflicts cannot be found in the realm of brute facts—if there 
even is such a realm—because facts are viewed through the lens of 
                                                 
1 For useful summaries and citations regarding the ideological conflicts over 
intercountry adoption, see ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS:  ADOPTION, INFERTILITY, 
AND THE NEW WORLD OF CHILD PRODUCTION xxi-xxii, 141-63 (Beacon Press 1999) (1993); 
Sara Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry Adoption Reflect Human Rights Principles: 
Transforming the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child with the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U. INT’L L. J. 179 (2003). 
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worldviews, and often seem powerless to conquer strong ideological 
commitment.  
Fortunately, it is possible to bring some clarity to the debates 
concerning intercountry adoption, despite the inability to resolve the 
core ideological conflicts.  We can seek broadly acceptable definitions for 
when adoption has clearly denigrated into child trafficking, even if we 
cannot agree on whether intercountry adoption is per se a form of 
trafficking.  We can seek reform of intercountry adoption, even as some 
argue that intercountry adoption is an evil that should be abolished. 
Initially, it is helpful to guide the ethical inquiry over intercountry 
adoption by reference to two adoption “triads.”2  The first triad, intrinsic 
to adoption itself, is the set of complex relationships between birth 
family, adoptive family, and child.  The second triad, specific to 
intercountry adoption, is the complex set of relationships between the 
child and sending and receiving nations.   
 
The ethical touchstone of intercountry adoption should be the 
imperative to respect the dignity and rights of all members of both 
triads.  This imperative comes not merely from the broad ethical 
mandate to respect all human persons, and all nation-states, but it also 
follows from the unique nature of the adoption triads.  In each adoption 
triad, the child is the central figure because the child is inherently and 
permanently connected in profound ways to all of the other triad 
members and links the triad members to one another.  The child’s 
inherent and permanent relationship to all triad members means that the 
                                                 
2 The language of an adoption “triad” or “triangle” is common in adoption literature.  
See, e.g., E. WAYNE CARP, ADOPTION IN AMERICA, at 1, 19 (2002) [hereinafter CARP, 
ADOPTION]; ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET. AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE:  SEALED OR OPEN 
RECORDS:  HOW THEY AFFECTED ADOPTEES, BIRTHPARENTS, AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS (1978). 
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child’s best interests cannot be considered in isolation from the rights of 
the other triad members.  An adoption built upon a severe deprivation of 
the rights of the birth family, for example, intrinsically harms the child as 
well, because of the child’s profound and permanent connection to her 
birth family.  The same can be said about all of the other members of 
each triad.  Thus, to the degree that adoption seriously harms a triad 
member, the child also is harmed.  From this perspective, the only kind 
of adoption that can serve the “best interests of children” is adoption that 
honors all triad members.  Of course this does not mean that all triad 
members receive everything they demand, but it does mean that 
attempts to save children at the expense of the dignity and well-being of 
birth or adoption families or nations are inherently flawed.  Ethical 
adoption, therefore, is adoption that respects the dignity and rights of all 
triad members.   
The adoption triad reminds us that the legal fiction of no continuing 
relationship between adopted child and birth family is just that—a 
fiction.  Indeed, the contemporary experience of adoption indicates that 
even adopted individuals with excellent relationships with their 
adoptive families yearn to know, or at least know about, their birth 
families.3  Reunions are attempted and arranged across the barriers of 
oceans, cultures, and language.4  In intercountry adoption, moreover, the 
continuing psychological link to the birth family is closely related to the 
continuing link to the birth nation.  Consider, for example, the common 
instance of a Korean girl adopted by a white American family.  It would 
take a willful blindness to deny the Korean adoptee’s family ties to 
Korean parents and the nation of Korea.  Indeed, the Korean adoptee 
cannot escape the obvious—that her physical body did not descend in 
any way from her adoptive parents.  Every part of her physical 
appearance points back to Korea.  No matter how American she is, she is 
also inevitably, permanently, and inescapably Korean.5  Thus, any 
system of adoption built upon denying her Korean identity—or 
demeaning, dishonoring, or victimizing the family and nation from 
which she came—in principle harms the adoptee herself. 
                                                 
3 See Barbara Melosh, Adoption Stories, in ADOPTION IN AMERICA 218-45 (E. Wayne Carp 
ed., 2002) (reviewing literature of adoption narratives). 
4 See, e.g., JANE JEONG TRENKA, THE LANGUAGE OF BLOOD: A MEMOIR (2003);  FIRST 
PERSON PLURAL (Dean Bortshay Liem 2000) (documentary film). 
5 See ADAM PERTMAN, ADOPTION NATION:  HOW THE ADOPTION REVOLUTION IS 
TRANSFORMING AMERICA 52-53 (2000). 
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From this perspective, intercountry adoption is neither an inherent 
good nor an inherent evil but rather it is a potential or conditional good.  
To the degree that an adoption, or system of adoption, meets the criteria 
of treating all triad members fairly—giving them their “due”—then the 
system has positive merit.  To the degree that an adoption, or system of 
adoption, victimizes or demeans one or more triad members, adoption is 
no longer a good, but becomes—at least in significant part—an evil, and 
one that is generally harmful to the child.   
As a matter of abstract philosophy, it might be possible to become 
lost in interminable debates over what it means to respect members of 
the triad.6  Fortunately, however, it is possible to rely on legal documents 
and principles defining proper treatment toward the various triad 
members.  These legal documents provide, at a minimum, plausible 
starting points for defining the proper treatment of each triad member, 
and hence, the minimum requisites of a legitimate intercountry 
adoption.  These legal documents also stand for the proposition that 
certain legal harms, such as trafficking or selling children, generally 
cannot be justified by claims of other “goods.”  Although it is certainly 
possible to argue that these legal standards are ethically flawed, this 
Article will presume that these legal standards, many of which are 
drawn from international legal materials, are plausible from a broad 
range of worldviews.  After all, an attempt to “save a child” by reducing 
the child to an article of commerce, or by inducing her birth parents to 
sell her, would seek to validate victimization of the child and her loved 
ones in the name of the best interests of the child. 
A purpose of this Article, therefore, will be to look beyond the fog of 
the ideological conflict, to the legal standards for a legitimate 
intercountry adoption.  Put another way, this Article will seek the legal 
standard for discovering when intercountry adoption is really a form of 
child trafficking, and hence is legally and ethically illegitimate. 
                                                 
6 As Professor Carp has noted, the position that adoption, or at least traditional closed 
adoption, is inherently harmful to the child, leads to the argument that such adoption 
should be abolished.  E.g., E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS:  SECRECY AND DISCLOSURES IN 
THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION 222 (1998) [hereinafter CARP, FAMILY MATTERS] (noting the 
parallel argument in regard to intercountry adoption is that intercountry adoption is 
inherently exploitative and harms children by stripping them of their culture and 
language).  I am seeking to avoid these ideological arguments, however valid or invalid, 
and instead attempt to apply broadly acceptable legal and ethical standards against selling 
and trafficking children. 
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II.  DEFINING ADOPTION AS CHILD TRAFFICKING:  THE LEGAL STANDARDS 
A.  Development of International Definitions on Trafficking 
Despite the broad international condemnation of trafficking in 
children, it is not easy to find a complete and authoritative legal 
definition.  Under these circumstances, it is helpful to begin with the 
dictionary definitions of the terms “traffick” or “trafficking.”  The most 
relevant meanings of these terms include the import and export trade, 
and the business of buying and selling.7  The concept of trafficking in 
children generally refers, therefore, to the buying and selling of children.  
The term would be most applicable where a child was sold and then 
moved a significant distance, particularly across borders, but any sale of 
a child should suffice as a form of “trafficking.”  Thus, a sale of a child 
would be a form of “child trafficking.” 
It should also be helpful to trace the lineage of the legal 
condemnation of child trafficking.  The legal conception of trafficking 
appears to be a derivative of long-standing legal condemnations of 
slavery and “slavery-like” practices.  Logically, the link is obvious:  
normally the buying and selling of human beings implies a kind of 
ownership of a human being equivalent to, or at least analogous to, 
slavery.  Both buying and selling human beings, and enslaving them, 
reduces human beings to articles of commerce.  Moreover, slavery has 
generally been associated with the “slave trade,” and hence efforts to 
abolish slavery have also focused on abolishing the “slave trade.”  Since 
the term “trade” and “trafficking” can be used as synonyms, the term 
“trafficking” in this context connotes a kind of slave trade. 
It is therefore possible to follow the international concern with 
trafficking in children as a development of international documents 
intended to abolish slavery.  In the 1926 Slavery Convention (“1926 
Convention”), slavery is defined as “the status or condition of a person 
over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership 
are exercised.”8  The “slave trade”: 
[I]ncludes all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or 
disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; 
all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view 
                                                 
7 WEBSTER’S  NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY  938 (7th ed. 1967). 
8 Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, art. 1(1), T.S. No. 778 [hereinafter 1926 Slavery 
Convention]. 
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to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale 
or exchange of a slave acquired with a view to being 
sold or exchanged, and, in general, every act of trade or 
transport in slaves.9 
The ambiguity of this definition is made evident by its application to 
the kinds of abusive adoption practices at concern in this Article.  For 
example, in the Andhra Pradesh, India adoption scandals it was revealed 
that scouts had been sent to purchase infants from impoverished birth 
parents; the scout in turn would be paid by the orphanage for the child, 
receiving a substantially higher sum than had been paid to the birth 
parents.  In this instance, the child would have been sold twice:  once by 
the birth parent to the scout, and then a second time, at a profit, by the 
scout to the orphanage.  The orphanage would then place the child for 
adoption to a family in the United States, receiving adoption “fees” more 
than ten times higher than what it had paid for the child.10  Similarly, 
some U.S. agents apparently hire “spotters” as their agents in Latin 
America, Asia, and Eastern Europe, paying these intermediaries 
“bounties” as high as ten-thousand dollars for each child they find, and 
apparently not looking too closely at how the children were obtained.11  
Do such practices constitute either the “slave trade” or “slavery” under 
the 1926 Convention?   
A close examination of the definition of the “slave trade” reveals that 
the mere sale of a human being is not necessarily sufficient to meet the 
definition; instead, the sale must involve either the sale of a “slave” or 
the intent to reduce the individual to slavery.  The question therefore 
becomes:  Are children slaves or under slavery, merely because they 
have been sold?  The legal definition of “slavery” is ambiguous on this 
point, for the definition of slavery leaves its key terms—“powers 
attaching to the right of ownership”—undefined.  A slave is someone 
over whom any power “attaching to the right of ownership” is 
“exercised,” but what are those powers?  It could be argued that the 
power to sell or alienate is a traditional “right of ownership,” and 
therefore that selling a human being makes her a slave, regardless of 
what is done with the person.  According to this interpretation, a child 
purchased from her birth parents and resold to an orphanage would be a 
                                                 
9 Id. at art. 1(2). 
10 See David M. Smolin, The Two Faces of Intercountry Adoption:  The Significance of the 
Indian Adoption Scandals, SETON HALL L. REV.  (forthcoming Winter 2005). 
11 See  PERTMAN, supra note 5, at 195-96. 
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slave, even though the ultimate intent and result of this process was to 
place her into an adoptive family.   
Such an interpretation has both legal and intuitive flaws.  Legally 
speaking, it renders certain terms in the definition of “slave trade” 
superfluous.  The definition of “slave trade” has several definitions all 
involving two elements:  One element pertains to sale or exchange.  A 
second element requires the person exchanged to be a “slave” or the 
persons exchanging to possess the intent to “reduce . . . to slavery.”  If 
the element of sale or exchange of a person by definition meets the 
definition of slavery, then the second element is superfluous, for by 
definition every sale or exchange of a person would constitute the sale or 
exchange of a slave.  A legal interpretation that renders a key element of 
a definition superfluous would generally be disfavored. 
Second, it is counter-intuitive to view every “sale” of a person as 
rendering that person a slave.  While the children purchased from birth 
parents and scouts were bought and sold like chattel, the ultimate intent 
was to place the children into families as sons or daughters, which seems 
contrary to the definition of a slave.  Of course it is possible to take an 
ideological position that the custodial status of being a child is a kind of 
slavery, but that position certainly does not reflect the perspective of the 
law.  The purpose of anti-slavery and anti-trafficking provisions, after 
all, is not to abolish childhood or the family.  It is counter-intuitive to call 
an infant sold for purposes of adoption a “slave,” despite the repugnant 
nature of the act.   
The ambiguities and limitations in the definitions of slavery and the 
slave trade in the 1926 Convention are addressed in the 1956 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, 
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (“Supplementary 
Slavery Convention”).12  Interestingly, the Supplementary Slavery 
Convention retains the definition of “slavery” of the 1926 Convention13 
and almost the entire definition of “slave trade” from the 1926 
Convention.  Although easy to miss, however, the  slight change in the 
“slave trade” definition may be significant.  The 1926  Convention stated 
that the slave trade “includes . . . all acts of disposal by sale or exchange 
                                                 
12 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Supplementary Slavery Convention]. 
13 Compare 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 8, at art. 1(1), with Supplementary 
Slavery Convention, supra note 12, at art. 7(a). 
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of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged.” 14  However, 
the Supplementary Slavery Convention defined slave trade to 
“include . . . all acts of disposal of a person acquired with a view to being 
sold or exchanged.15 
This slight change of wording from “slave” to “person” would seem 
to mean that the mere “disposal”—including sale—of a human being 
who was “acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged” now would 
constitute the slave trade.  Thus, when individuals in India bought 
infants from birth parents, with a plan to re-sell the children to an 
orphanage, this would apparently constitute the slave trade, even 
though the children were to be placed into adoption.  A sale of a human 
being could constitute the “slave trade,” even if the person sold was 
never made into a “slave.” 
This interpretation, however, founders on an examination of the rest 
of the Supplementary Slavery Convention, which in every other 
context—and every operative context pertaining to slavery—refers to the 
transfer, conveyance, branding, and marking, of slaves, rather than of 
persons.16  Indeed, even if this new definition of the slave trade in the 
Supplementary Slavery Convention is taken literally, there is no 
generalized provision within the Supplementary Slavery Convention 
condemning the slave trade as such.17  The assumption of the 
Supplementary Slavery Convention is that it is “supplementary” to the 
1926  Convention, and therefore the Supplementary Slavery Convention 
does not repeat the core undertaking of the 1926  Convention to prohibit 
slavery or the slave trade. 
The issues posed by the Supplementary Slavery Convention go 
beyond the significance of this re-worded definition of the slave trade, to 
encompass the Supplementary Slavery Convention’s broadening concern 
with “Practices Similar to Slavery.”18  Thus, the Convention requires 
state parties to take necessary measures to abolish certain practices, 
“whether or not they are covered by the definition of slavery contained 
                                                 
14 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 8, at art. 1(2) (emphasis added). 
15 Supplementary Slavery Convention, supra note 12, at art. 7(c) (emphasis added). 
16 See id. at art. 3-7. 
17 Article 3 creates undertakings to prohibit various aspects of the slave trade, but the 
first three subsections refer to slaves; article 3(4) does refer to international cooperation in 
combating the “slave trade.”  See id. at art. 3. 
18 The term “Practices Similar to Slavery” comes from the title of the Convention.  See id. 
at art. 1. 
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in Article 1 of the Slavery Convention.”19  These practices include debt 
bondage, serfdom, various practices transferring women involuntarily, 
and certain matters involving children.20  The provisions involving 
women and children are most relevant to the issue of adoption.   
In regard to women, the Convention requires state parties to bring 
about the abolition of “any institution or practice” whereby “[a] woman, 
without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on payment 
of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or 
any other person or group.”21  
Thus, transferring a woman for financial consideration into a marital 
relationship, without her consent, is condemned as a practice similar to 
slavery.  This provision is not based on the viewpoint that the status of a 
wife is a kind of slavery, either generally or within particular cultural 
contexts, however much some might argue for such a perspective.  Thus, 
this practice is condemned even though the individual sold is not 
reduced to the status of a slave.   
From one perspective, this provision on women is directly analogous 
to the sale of a child for adoption:  In both instances an individual is 
involuntarily sold for financial consideration into a family relationship.  
The difficulty with the analogy, however, is the key difference between a 
woman and a child.  It is permissible for an infant to be transferred into a 
family relationship without the infant’s consent, particularly since 
infants lack the capacity to consent.  The question of women, whether 
minors or adults, marrying without consent is, however, an entirely 
different matter.  Even if women—or men—have in some cultures in the 
past married by the will of their parents or family, without their consent, 
this practice is condemned in modern international law.  Thus, the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1976 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights both declare that 
“[m]arriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of 
the intending spouses.”22   
                                                 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at art. 1(a), (b), (c), (d). 
21 Id. at art. 1(c). 
22 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, U.N. 
Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. 
Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).  There are some 
insignificant differences in wording between the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 
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This difference between “transfers” of women and transfers of 
children may be highlighted by analyzing another of the subsections of 
the Supplementary Slavery Convention, which condemns the practice 
whereby a “woman, on the death of her husband, is liable to be inherited 
by another person.”23  Within the context of the Supplementary Slavery 
Convention, it appears that this section primarily refers to practices 
whereby a widow is involuntarily assigned a new husband—often a 
relative of her husband—upon her husband’s death.  In order to 
compare the situation of women to children, we should ask whether a 
similar practice concerning children would be so clearly condemned.  
What if a parent provided that upon her death, her child would become 
the child of a certain individual—perhaps an uncle or aunt of the child?  
Such a practice is in fact not substantially different from the 
contemporary U.S. practice of including a guardianship provision in a 
will, providing who shall be the guardian of the child upon the death of 
a parent.  Such a provision is generally viewed positively, rather than 
negatively, even though one could rhetorically refer to it as “inheriting” 
a child. 
The forbidden practice in which a widow is passed as a kind of 
inheritance does not involve any financial consideration.  Similarly, 
another subsection of the Supplementary Slavery Convention condemns 
practices whereby “[t]he husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has 
the right to transfer her to another person for value received or 
otherwise.”24  This provision can involve transfers for financial 
consideration, but does not require such financial consideration:  It is the 
“transfer” of the woman which is the essence of the wrong.  The 
Convention’s prohibition of a bride price, discussed above, does involve 
financial consideration, but only forbids the giving of such financial 
consideration when the woman has no right to refuse.  Thus, a bride 
price is apparently permissible under the Supplementary Slavery 
Convention so long as the woman has the right to refuse the marriage.25  
Therefore, the essence of the forbidden slavery-like practices affecting 
women is not the financial consideration or sale, but rather the 
involuntary marriage of the woman.  Thus, the provisions of the 
Supplementary Slavery Convention are treating as a “slavery-like” 
practice the involuntary transfer of women into the family relationship 
of marriage.  Given the Convention’s focus on lack of consent, the 
                                                 
23 Supplementary Slavery Convention, supra note 12, at art. 1(c)(iii). 
24 Id. at art. 1(c)(ii). 
25 Id. at art. 1(c)(i) (“A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage 
on payment of a consideration.”) (emphasis added). 
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provisions on transfer of women for marriage cannot be analogized to 
the transfer of children for purposes of adoption, as infants necessarily 
are transferred for adoption without their consent.  Indeed, the failure of 
the Supplementary Slavery Convention to include parallel provisions 
concerning children could be viewed as a deliberate decision not to 
condemn the sale of children for adoption as a practice “similar to 
slavery.”   
The Supplementary Slavery Convention does contain a specific 
provision on children, which condemns any “institution or practice 
whereby a child . . . is delivered by either or both of his natural parents 
or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a 
view to the exploitation of the child . . . or of his  labour.”26 
In this provision, the question of financial consideration received for 
the transfer is secondary, as the wrong can occur without receipt of such 
consideration.  The essence of the wrong is the transfer by the parent to 
another person with a “view” toward the “exploitation of the child.”27  
There are two key ambiguities here.  The first is the question of who 
must possess the evil intent, or “view,” to exploit the child.  Must the 
parent who delivers the child possess the culpable intent, or is it 
sufficient if the person receiving the child possesses this intent to exploit?  
This question is not an academic question, as contemporary child 
trafficking often involves individuals obtaining the child through 
misleading the parents.  Parents may be told that their children will 
receive benefits, like education, apprenticeships, or good jobs, when the 
real intent is to exploit the children through prostitution or illicit and 
hazardous child labor.28  Similarly, in intercountry adoption it sometimes 
happens that parents believe their children are only being taken away on 
a temporary basis, to receive benefits like housing, food, and an 
education, while the persons receiving the children actually intend the 
children to be adopted.29  It is unfortunate that this provision is not 
                                                 
26 Id. art. (1)(d). 
27 Id. 
28 See, e.g., Anti-Slavery Society, Child Slaves of South Asia, at http://www.anti-
slaverysociety.addr.com/slaverysasia.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2004). 
29 See, e.g., Jorge L. Carro, Regulation of Intercountry Adoption:  Can the Abuses Come to an 
End?, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 121, 144 (1994) (stating that the U.S. embassy 
investigating Romanian adoptions discovered “incidents where Romanian mothers 
believed that they were merely ‘loaning’ their children to foreign parents and not 
relinquishing them permanently”).  Because of difficulties with ascertaining the actual 
intent of parents who place children into orphanages, the Hague Convention on 
Intercountry Adoption specifically requires counseling regarding “whether or not an 
adoption will result in the termination of the legal relationship between the child and his or 
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clearer, therefore, because the question of whose intent counts is critical 
to the reach of the prohibition. 
The second ambiguity in the Supplementary Slavery Convention’s 
provision on children is the meaning of the term exploitation.  
Unfortunately, this key term is not defined in the Supplementary Slavery 
Convention.  One can assume that child prostitution or child 
pornography would be forms of “exploitation,” but the meaning beyond 
those obvious forms of exploitation is not so clear.  Are all transfers in 
which an individual under eighteen works considered an exploitation of 
the child or his labor?  And what about adoption:  could adoption ever 
be a form of exploitation? 
The exploitation of children through labor or commercial sex are 
elaborated in a number of legal instruments, such as the Convention 
Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of 
the Worst Forms of Child Labour.30  Indeed, the development of the law 
of “trafficking” concerning both women and children is directed 
principally at trafficking for purposes of labor or sexual exploitation, due 
to the notorious nature of these problems in the contemporary world.31  
The problem of defining forms of “exploitation” beyond sex or labor is, 
however, much more difficult.  The problem is illustrated by the 2001 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, which is a supplement to the U.N. 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (“2001 Protocol”).32  
The definition of “trafficking” in the 2001 Protocol both returns us to the 
                                                                                                             
her family of origin.”  Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in 
Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, art. 4(c)(1), 32 I.L.M. 1134 [hereinafter 
Hague Convention].  Absent such counseling, the consent of birth parents to an adoption 
would apparently be invalid.  Due to similar concerns, U.S. regulations governing who is 
an orphan eligible for intercountry adoption note:  “A child who is placed temporarily in 
an orphanage shall not be considered to be abandoned if the parents express an intention to 
retrieve the child, are contributing or attempting to contribute to the support of the child, 
or otherwise exhibit ongoing parental interest in the child.”  8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b) (2004). 
30 Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of 
the Worst Forms of Child Labour,  June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161. 
31 See, e.g., Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8) (2000) (defining 
“severe forms of trafficking in persons” as involving sex trafficking or trafficking for the 
purposes of involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery); id. § 7101(b) 
(finding that trafficking in persons is a modern form of slavery often involving the 
“international sex trade” and also “forced labor” and “slavery-like labor”). 
32 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children; Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25,  U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. 
A/45/49 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Protocol]. 
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original problem of trying to define trafficking in children, while also 
constituting an attempt to define the undefined term “exploitation” from 
the  Supplementary Slavery Convention provision on children.  The 2001 
Protocol definition states that “Trafficking in persons”:  
[S]hall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat 
or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, 
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a 
position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person 
having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation.  Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, 
the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other 
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs.33 
In broad terms, the 2001 Protocol definition of human trafficking 
contains three elements:  (1) some transfer, harbouring or receipt of a 
person; (2) by wrongful means, broadly defined to include coercion, 
deception, abduction, abuse of power, or payment; and (3) for purposes 
of exploitation.  However, the 2001 Protocol specifies that trafficking in 
persons exists when the first and third elements, transfer and 
exploitation, are present, even if there are no wrongful means.34 
This definition is broader than some definitions of trafficking 
because it includes non-financial, but wrongful, transfers.  In the end, 
however, the definition hinges on the question of the purpose of the 
transfer, which centers on the meaning of the term “exploitation.”  The 
definition of exploitation is helpful but deliberately open-ended; it gives 
a “minimum” set of purposes deemed exploitative, while permitting the 
list to be enlarged.  The following list of minimum inclusions is primarily 
familiar:  (1) sexual exploitation; (2) forced labor; (3) slavery or practices 
similar to slavery—presumably as defined in the 1926 Slavery 
Convention and the 1995 Supplementary Slavery Convention; 4) 
servitude; and 5) the removal of organs.35 
                                                 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at art. (3)(c). 
35 See id. at art. 3(a). 
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Most of these named forms of “exploitation” would be typically 
inapplicable to a situation where a child was sold for adoption.  Children 
placed in adoption are not being sold into sexual exploitation, forced 
labor, or servitude.  There have been recurrent rumors in sending 
countries of children being “adopted” for their organs, but these 
sensational and inflammatory allegations are generally regarded as 
baseless.36  Thus, we are left, in this section, with a problem of circular 
definitions.  The Supplementary Slavery Convention defines the transfer 
of children for purposes of exploitation as a practice similar to slavery, 
and the 2001 Protocol defines exploitation to include practices similar to 
slavery.  Hence, the children are subject to a practice similar to slavery if 
they are exploited, and they are exploited if they are subject to a practice 
similar to slavery.  Moreover, as we have seen, the sale of children for 
adoption is apparently not a form of slavery itself because adopted 
children are not slaves.  
Although the 2001 Protocol leaves open the possibility of additional 
unnamed forms of exploitation, it would be difficult to sustain the claim 
that adoption itself is a form of exploitation.  One could argue that an 
adoptive parent “exploits” the child’s need of love and care to obtain a 
child’s love and loyalty, but this seems strained.  Using this kind of 
reasoning, every possible kind of relationship could be deemed a form of 
exploitation, and every mutually beneficial relationship could be labeled 
a condemnable crime.  More aptly, buying or stealing an infant or child 
could be viewed as a kind of exploitation, but since these acts already 
violate the elements of “trafficking” relating to the wrongful transfer, it 
is difficult to see how they could also constitute the separate element of 
exploitation.  The definition of trafficking in the 2001 Protocol seems to 
view a wrongful transfer of a human being as insufficient in itself to 
constitute trafficking; rather, something more—an exploitative 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., CARP, FAMILY MATTERS, supra note 6, at 228 (noting, but dismissing as false, 
“rumors” of intercountry adoption being used to run organ transplant rings); Carro, supra 
note 29, at 128-31 (documenting the history of the rumor that internationally adopted 
children were being used as organ banks, while noting that the U.S. government has 
extensively investigated such claims and found them “baseless”); Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, Ms. Ofelia Calcetas-
Santos, Addendum:  Report on the Mission to Guatemala, Commission on Human Rights, 56th 
Sess., Agenda Item 13, at 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/73/Add.2 (2000) [hereinafter Report 
on the Mission to Guatemala] (noting that “sensational” reports of organ selling in 
Guatemala led to an arrest and riot, but that World Health Officials could not substantiate 
allegations, and that “[s]ome individuals believe that the rumors were part of an 
orchestrated campaign to foster resentment against foreigners, especially during the peace 
negotiations”). 
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purpose—is also required.  And adoption, in itself, would not appear to 
be an exploitative purpose. 
This indeterminate tour of definitions of trafficking in persons, 
women, or children would not be complete without a brief review of the 
seminal Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”).37  The  CRC 
broadly condemns “the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for 
any purpose or in any form,”38 but it does not contain any definition of 
trafficking.  The provisions of the CRC on intercountry adoption are 
quite significant to defining standards for intercountry adoption, and 
certainly buying children or otherwise obtaining them without proper 
parental consent would violate those standards.39  The CRC, in itself, 
however, does not answer the question of when these kinds of wrongs 
constitute a form of child trafficking. 
This preliminary review of both the dictionary meaning of “child 
trafficking,” and the historical development of international legal norms 
governing slavery and trafficking, reveals a paradox.  On the one hand, 
buying children and sending them across national boundaries would 
seem to meet the dictionary definition of “trafficking in children,” even if 
done as a part of an adoption.  On a linguistic and intuitive level, buying 
and selling children would seem to be included in any plausible 
definition of “child trafficking.”  On the other hand, the various 
international legal definitions of slavery, practices similar to slavery, and 
trafficking, seem to generally require something more than the sale of a 
human being, and that “something more” is not met by sending the child 
across national boundaries.  These legal definitions of slavery, slavery-
like practices, and trafficking seem to require intent or an act harmful to 
the person enslaved or trafficked.  The victim must be made a slave or 
servant, subject to forced or exploitative labor, sexually exploited, or 
involuntarily married.  And generally speaking, the law would not 
characterize being adopted as a harm, let alone a harm equivalent to 
these serious forms of exploitation. 
It is rational to construct a legal definition more narrowly than the 
dictionary meaning of that same term, particularly when defining 
serious penal wrongs or crimes. The law, in proscribing harms, generally 
will aim its prohibitions at the worst and most relevant harms, while 
                                                 
37 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th  Sess., Supp. 
No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989) [hereinafter CRC]. 
38 Id. at art. 35. 
39 For a discussion of the CRC and adoption, see Smolin, supra note 10. 
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avoiding peripheral definitional issues.  In the experience of society, the 
central harms associated with slavery and trafficking have been chattel 
slavery, forced labor, and trafficking in human beings for purposes of 
exploitative sex or labor, and thus the legal definitions have required 
these sorts of harms.   
Characterizing all exchanges of children for money as illicit 
trafficking would pose some surprisingly difficult issues for the law.  
The difficulty, as the Supreme Court has famously explained in other 
contexts, is that children “are always in some form of custody.”40  Thus, 
any child custody transfer that is associated in any way with some 
financial consideration can be characterized as the “sale of a child.”  
Consider a typical divorce case in which one party drops a claim for 
child custody in exchange for the other party accepting a lower financial 
settlement.  Though such divorce settlements are not explicitly presented 
in a strict quid pro quo form, the substance of giving up a custodial claim 
in exchange for a more favorable financial settlement may be all too 
common.41  Even if one looks askance at this kind of situation, it would 
seem extreme to label this kind of negotiation as illicit “child trafficking.”   
As we will see, these difficulties in avoiding explicit or implicit sales 
of children haunt even domestic adoption.  For all these reasons, it is not 
surprising that international law for many years defined “trafficking” 
narrowly, and avoided characterizing all quid pro quo transactions 
involving children as illicit child trafficking. 
                                                 
40 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (“[J]uveniles, unlike adults, are always in 
some form of custody.”). 
41 Justice Neely of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia cited the propensity 
of such bargaining as a reason for the court to employ the more certain “primary caretaker” 
presumption in child custody disputes, rather than the unpredictable multi-factor test.  
Garska v. McCory, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360 (W. Va. 1981).  Justice Neely stated: 
The loss of children is a terrifying specter to concerned and loving 
parents; however, it is particularly terrifying to the primary caretaker 
parent who, by virtue of the caretaking function, was closest to the 
child before the divorce. . . .  Since the parent who is not the primary 
caretaker is usually in the superior financial position, the subsequent 
welfare of the child depends to a substantial degree upon the level of 
support payments which are awarded in the course of a divorce. Our 
experience instructs us that uncertainty about the outcome of custody 
disputes leads to the irresistible temptation to trade the custody of the child 
in return for lower alimony and child support payments.  Since trial court 
judges generally approve consensual agreements on child support, 
underlying economic data which bear upon the equity of settlements 
are seldom investigated at the time an order is entered. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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B. International Definitions of Trafficking Specifically Addressing Adoption 
1. Adoption as the Prohibited Sale of a Child Under the 2000 Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography (“OP-CRC”). 
In recent years, scandalous and illicit activities associated with 
intercountry adoption, along with the growing ideological controversy 
concerning intercountry adoption, have once again come to the attention 
of the international community.  Given the growing international 
concern with child trafficking, the problem of abusive intercountry 
adoption practices has increasingly been defined in terms of the 
notorious problem of international child trafficking.42  Under these 
circumstances, the gap between the common sense concept of child 
trafficking and the strict legal definitions has become significant.  Thus, 
international legal materials have cautiously begun to specifically 
address the question of when intercountry adoption has descended into 
a form of illicit child trafficking.  While these developments are likely 
incomplete, they are significant. 
The primary international document directly addressing 
intercountry adoption as a form of child trafficking is the OP-CRC.43  
Significantly, the United States has ratified the OP-CRC, even though it 
has not ratified the CRC.  Therefore, the OP-CRC is not merely 
international law, but it constitutes international law that is binding 
within the United States.44   
The OP-CRC defines the “sale of children” as “any act or transaction 
whereby a child is transferred by any person or group of persons to 
                                                 
42 The problem of abusive intercountry adoption practices, and in particular baby-
selling, has plagued the international community for decades.  For a 1994 account of what 
was, even by then, an old problem, see Carro, supra note 29, at 131-43 (documenting “baby 
trafficking” problems in Peru, Brazil, Paraguay, Columbia, Honduras, Sri Lanka, and 
Romania).  Recent reports on the problem of trafficking sometimes include, to a modest 
degree, adoption-related trafficking.  See, e.g., THE PROTECTION PROJECT AT JOHNS HOPKINS 
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, 
ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE AMERICAS 41-43 (2000). 
43 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Right of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 263, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/54/263 (2000) (entered into force Jan. 18, 2002) [hereinafter OP-CRC]. 
44 See Michael J. Dennis, Newly Adopted Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 789 (2000); Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Status of Ratifications of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, available at http://www.unhchr. 
ch/html/menu2/6/crc/treaties/status-opsc.htm (last modified Nov. 14, 2003). 
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another for remuneration or any other consideration.”45  In defining the 
situations where the “sale of children” must be legally prohibited, the 
OP-CRC includes”[i]mproperly inducing consent, as an intermediary, for 
the adoption of a child in violation of applicable international legal 
instruments on adoption.”46  The term “applicable international legal 
instruments on adoption” is understood to refer to the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption (“Hague Convention”).47  The 
Hague Convention explicitly includes as one of its “objects” the 
prevention of “the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children.”48  
Although the Hague Convention contains no definition of the sale of, or 
trafficking in, children, the OP-CRC has effectively made the Hague 
Convention’s sections on consent to adoption into a critical part of the 
definition of illicit child selling.  Thus, where an intermediary induces 
consent to adoption in a manner that violates the Hague standards, and a 
child is transferred “for remuneration or any other consideration,” then 
the illicit sale of a child has occurred.  Moreover, although there is no 
separate definition of “child trafficking,” the term presumably would 
include any illicit sale of a child, particularly where the child is moved 
geographically. 
Thus, as a matter of international law, intercountry adoption 
constitutes illicit child selling and child trafficking where an 
intermediary induces consent to adoption in violation of the standards of 
the Hague Convention and when the child is transferred for 
remuneration or any consideration.  As a technical matter, both 
elements—inducement of consent by an intermediary in a manner 
violating Hague standards and the transfer of children for remuneration 
or consideration—must be established to constitute the kind of “sale of 
children” that literally violates the standards of the OP-CRC. 
The OP-CRC prohibition of adoption as illicit child selling contains 
several apparent gaps.  First, the prohibition, as literally written, does 
                                                 
45 OP-CRC, supra note 43, at art. 2(a). 
46 Id. at art. 3(a)(ii). 
47 See e.g., United Nations Treaty Collection, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, United 
States of America:  Ratification, available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/CNs/2002/1301_ 
1400/1360E.doc (Jan. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Ratification OP-CRC] (stating that the United 
States understands the term “applicable international legal instruments” to refer to Hague 
Convention); Hague Convention, supra note 29; Dennis, supra note 44, at 793-94 (stating 
that the United States and Japan understood “applicable international legal instruments on 
adoption” to refer to Hague Convention). 
48 Hague Convention, supra note 29, at pmbl., art. 1. 
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not address situations where a child is taken from the birth family 
without any consent whatsoever, as in instances of abduction or 
kidnapping.  In such instances, there has not been an improper 
“inducing” of consent, and hence the OP-CRC is literally inapplicable, 
even if the child is later sold.  This situation would meet the OP-CRC 
definition of the “sale of children” but would not meet the OP-CRC 
definition of the prohibited sale of children.  Second, the literal terms of 
the OP-CRC require that an “intermediary” improperly induce consent 
and therefore do not address situations where adoptive families directly 
purchase children from birth parents without use of an intermediary.  Of 
course such wrongful acts violate the Hague Convention, and nations 
should prohibit them.  But the failure of the OP-CRC to include such 
abusive adoption practices within its definition of illicit sale of children, 
and thereby require penal sanctions for such practices, illustrates the 
cautious, partial manner in which international law is beginning to 
address abusive adoption practices.   
2.  Hague Standards for Valid Consent to Adoption as Applicable to the 
OP-CRC 
The Hague Convention standards for a valid consent to adoption are 
extensive and yet are ultimately a matter of broadly-held ethical 
adoption standards.  The standards have three requirements for consent 
by those, like birth parents, with custodial responsibilities and rights in 
relation to the child.  First, those parents giving consent to adoption must 
have received the equivalent of informed consent, including counseling 
“as necessary,” and being informed as to the legal effect of the consent, 
“in particular whether or not an adoption will result in the termination 
of the legal relationship between the child and his or her family of 
origin.”49  Second, the consent must not have “been induced by payment 
or compensation of any kind and have not been withdrawn.”50  Third, 
consent must be given “freely, in the required legal form, and expressed 
or evidenced in writing.”51  
It is clear, therefore, that “inducing” birth family members to 
relinquish children for adoption through the payment of money would 
violate the terms of the Hague Convention.  Moreover, such “inducing” 
monetary payments would also appear to constitute the separate 
definition of “sale of children,” under the OP-CRC, because they 
                                                 
49 Id. at art. 4, 5(b). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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constitute the transfer of the child for “remuneration or any other 
consideration.”52  Hence, where an intermediary induces consent to 
adoption through monetary payments or financial benefit, such acts 
would clearly constitute the prohibited sale of children under the OP-
CRC. 
In addition, where an intermediary obtains consent to adoption from 
a birth family through fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, failure to 
provide necessary counseling, or failure to disclose the legal effect of the 
consent, such adoption would also constitute a prohibited “sale of a 
child” under the OP-CRC where the child was transferred for 
“remuneration or any other consideration.”  Such remuneration or 
consideration could occur, moreover, in a subsequent transfer of the 
child not involving the original birth parents.  Children are often 
transferred multiple times, passing from an individual who obtains the 
child from the birth parent to an orphanage, perhaps passing from one 
orphanage to another, and then passing from the orphanage to the 
adoptive parents overseas.  If any of these transfers involve 
consideration paid for the transfer, and the original consent was illicit, 
then under the OP-CRC the sale of a child (and child trafficking) has 
occurred.   
3. Money as the Root of All Evil (or Much Uncertainty) Under the OP-
CRC and the Hague Convention  
We have seen that the developing international law definitions of 
illicit child trafficking, or the sale of children, do not yet address all 
situations within the common sense or dictionary definition of those 
terms.  The law has been reluctant to label all sales of children as 
prohibited forms of child trafficking and has failed to demand penal 
sanctions for all abusive adoption practices.  Yet, it is encouraging that 
the law has been moving in the direction of clearly labeling certain 
abusive adoption practices as prohibited forms of child trafficking or sale 
of children.  Certainly, it seems to be the intent of the OP-CRC to clearly 
and definitively label some abusive adoption practices as the illicit sale 
of children subject to penal sanction. 
Unfortunately, further analysis will demonstrate that the kinds of 
wrongs addressed by the OP-CRC, which involve an illicit transfer of a 
child for “remuneration or other consideration,” are not effectively 
prohibited by law.  The difficulty, as we shall see, is that the law is not in 
                                                 
52 See OP-CRC, supra note 43, at art. 2(a). 
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a position to clearly differentiate, in the context of adoption, between licit 
and illicit payments of money.  Once the law loses its capacity to 
distinguish clearly between prohibited and permitted provisions of 
financial benefit, the effectiveness of legal prohibitions against the “sale 
of children” virtually collapses.   
Under the OP-CRC, there are essentially two points at which illicit 
consideration may be involved:  (1) in inducing consent to adoption; or 
(2) in a subsequent transfer of the child.  In both instances, difficulties 
arise from the fact that payment of money in itself may be viewed as 
customary and licit.  Upon closer examination, distinguishing between 
licit and illicit payment of money in each instance may be difficult, not 
only theoretically but also in practice. 
C. Inducing Consent from Birth Parents 
1. The Domestic Adoption System Creates an Unstable Baseline for 
Distinguishing Between Licit and Illicit Payments of Money 
The letter and spirit of international law, and domestic law within 
the United States, forbids the payment of money or other consideration 
to birth parents to induce relinquishment of the child or consent to 
adoption.  Such payments are tantamount to buying a child.  However, 
state laws governing domestic adoption within the United States 
generally permit the provision of very significant “birth parent 
expenses,” including temporary living expenses, medical expenses, and 
counseling fees.  These payments are viewed as a gift, rather than legal 
consideration for consent to adoption.  Indeed, payment of such 
expenses in most states cannot be conditioned, or made reimbursable, 
based upon the birth mother actually consenting to the adoption.  
Moreover, birth parents cannot be bound to any pre-birth agreement to 
relinquish or place their child.53   
                                                 
53 The state of law and practice regarding money and domestic adoption is far messier 
than can be summarized in this section.  However, for useful material see National 
Adoption Information Clearinghouse, 2003 Adoption State Statute Series Statute-at-a-Glance, 
State Regulation of Adoption Expenses, available at http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/general/legal/ 
statutes/expenses.cfm (last updated July 23, 2004) [hereinafter NAIC Adoption Expenses]; 
see also ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 1988 & Supp. 2004); CYNTHIA 
D. MARTIN & DRU MARTIN GROVES, BEATING THE ADOPTION ODDS 156-61 (1998); PERTMAN, 
supra note 5, at 38-43, 185-208; Avi Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (1986); Sara L. Johnson, Annotation, Validity of Agreements to 
Pay Expenses Attendant on Birth of Child on Condition That Natural Parents Consent to Adoption 
of Child, 43 A.L.R. 4TH 935 (1986 & Supp. 2004). 
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The net effect of these rules in practice is unclear and casts a certain 
ethical cloud over domestic adoption.  The intent of the law is to 
prohibit, and generally even criminalize, the sale of children.  In practice, 
however,  prospective adoptive parents provide financial assistance to 
birth parents, directly or through intermediaries, precisely based on the 
hope and expectation of obtaining the child.  Certainly most prospective 
adoptive parents lack the funds or motivation to lavish financial 
assistance on birth mothers for the mere sake of compassion or kindness.  
Everyone understands that prospective adoptive parents are, in crude 
terms, “in it for the baby.”  The fact that the birth parents are free to 
accept the aid, and then ultimately keep the baby, does not ultimately 
change the truth that the assistance is provided at least in the hope that 
the birth parents will relinquish the child.  Indeed, such assistance could 
be compared to a “right of first refusal” real property contract in which 
the owners become contractually obligated, if they sell property, to offer 
it first to a particular individual.  Prospective adoptive parents who 
provide aid to birth parents are assuming that if the child is relinquished, 
they will be offered the child.  Since a “right of first refusal” provision for 
property is commonly made binding by financial consideration, it would 
appear that the aid provided to birth mothers really is a form of legal 
consideration.54   
The self-contradictory nature of the law is illustrated by California 
law, which simultaneously criminalizes both paying a birth parent to 
consent to adoption and a birth parent accepting benefits from 
prospective adoptive parents with the intent to not complete the 
adoption.55  Logically, the net effect of California law is to turn every 
provision of financial assistance by adoptive parents to birth parents into 
the sale of a child.  The adoptive parents’ “consideration” is the financial 
payment; the birth parents’ corollary consideration is the representation, 
under California law, that upon receipt of such benefits they sincerely 
intend to place their child with the adoptive family.  The birth parents’ 
legal rights to genuinely “change their minds” about adoption does not 
alter the fact that the present intent to place the child serves as a kind of 
consideration for the receipt of financial benefit.  The birth mother, in 
                                                 
54 Regarding the law of “right of first refusal” contracts, see 3 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 11.3-.4 (1996 & Supp. 2004).  Another way of addressing the 
obligations created by financial payments to birth parents would be through the doctrine of 
a “contract to bargain.”  See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 673 (1969). 
55 See  CAL. PENAL CODE  § 273 (West 2004). 
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essence, is paid for a truthful representation of intent to place her child 
with a particular family.  
An additional benefit to birth mothers, that of education expenses, 
has been specifically prohibited in some states and would appear to fall 
outside the range of permissible adoption expenses in most states.56  
However, adoption intermediaries nonetheless find a way of offering 
“scholarships” as a kind of implicit inducement, by creating and 
publicizing “scholarship” programs for birth mothers who place their 
children for adoption.57  Since the award of such “scholarships” 
generally would occur after the adoption, and are not necessarily 
guaranteed, the award would presumably escape the oversight of the 
courts that issue adoption decrees and review permissible forms of 
adoption expenses.  Thus, although more than a decade ago the 
provision of a college scholarship to a birth mother was seen as a sign of 
an illegal black market adoption,58 today adoption intermediaries openly 
tout their scholarship programs in their internet appeals to birth 
mothers.59  Presumably these intermediaries have been advised that so 
long as the scholarship is not formally guaranteed, no illegal inducement 
is present. 
The perception that children are being implicitly bought and sold 
within the domestic adoption system is furthered by the common 
practice of private agencies charging vastly different sums based on the 
race of the child.  Thus, it might cost thirty-thousand dollars to adopt a 
white infant but only ten-thousand dollars to adopt an African-American 
infant.60  Further, agencies charge extra for finding an infant quickly.61  It 
                                                 
56 See NAIC Adoption Expenses, supra note 53. 
57 See American Adoptions, at http://www.americanadoptions.com/pregnant/ 
scholarship (last visited Oct. 29, 2004) (describing “Birth Mother Scholarship Program”); 
Lifetime Adoption Facilitation Center, at http://www.lifetimeadoption.com/for_ 
birthmothers/bmresources.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2004); Lifetime Adoption Foundation, 
at http://www.lifetimefoundation.org (last visited Oct. 29, 2004) (advertising educational 
scholarships under their “Lifetime Adoption Foundation,” a nonprofit 501(c)(3) charity). 
58 See William Pierce & Robert J. Vitillo, Independent Adoptions and the ‘Baby Market,’ in 
ADOPTION:  INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 131, 140 (Euthymia D. Hibbs ed., 1991). 
59 See supra note 57. 
60 See Dean Schabner, ‘Buying and Selling,’ Preacher Calls Adoption Fees Discriminatory, 
(Mar. 12, 2004) at http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=91834&page=1.  This problem of 
differential fees based on race is not a new problem.  See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Spare 
Parts, Family Values, Old Children, Cheap, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 913, 918 (1994) (describing her 
own son’s adoption, with offer of a differential fee scale for “older, black, and other 
handicapped children”).  Of course Judge Posner had discussed these issues much earlier.  
See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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can be hard to see why the legitimate birth parent expenses and 
professional services would vary so substantially based on the race of the 
child or the speed of the adoption.  Whatever the explanations offered 
for such charges, the effect is to create a market in babies, with high-
demand characteristics of the infant (race, youth, and health) or the 
adoption speed of the adoption being allocated to the highest bidder.  
This contradicts the legal conception that adoption is guided principally 
by the best interests of the child, with money limited to the subsidiary 
role of providing reasonable fees for services.   
Occasionally, a decision from the courts makes the existence of an 
exchange of money for child patently clear.  Thus, in Gorden v. Cutler62 a 
Pennsylvania court concluded that a contract between the birth and 
prospective adoptive parents had existed: 
As the negotiations for the proposed adoption 
progressed, counsel recalled how he told the natural 
father ‘that [his] clients were willing to pay the medical 
expenses on condition that he [the natural father] sign a 
consent to adoption.’  This same condition was 
communicated on several occasions to the natural 
mother. . . .  Finally, as it appears on the record, counsel 
characterized the moment at which the custodial 
exchange occurred in the hospital dispassionately, as 
would occur in the culmination of any business 
transaction.  He stated it as:  ‘They signed.  I paid the 
bills, and they then turned the baby over to me.’  We 
find the aforesaid to be, in its simple form, descriptive of 
a contract, i.e., an offer, acceptance and consideration.63 
In this case, the birth parents subsequently changed their minds, and 
successfully obtained the return of their child prior to the filing of the 
adoption papers.64  The disappointed prospective adoption parents 
thereupon sued for reimbursement of the childbirth expenses they had 
provided to the birth parents, including hospital and physician costs 
associated with the birth mother’s pregnancy, delivery, and care of the 
                                                                                                             
61 Schabner, supra note 60 (noting that a “non-black baby” in nine to eighteen months 
costs nineteen thousand dollars to twenty-four thousand dollars, but twenty-seven 
thousand dollars to thirty-six thousand dollars in three to nine months). 
62 471 A.2d 449, 455 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 450. 
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child.65  The lower court found the contract unenforceable as a matter of 
public policy, but the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed, finding 
the contract enforceable and the birth parents responsible to reimburse 
the prospective adoptive parents.66  The court agreed that a “contract 
wherein a mother of a child agrees to adoption of her child by another in 
consideration of a monetary consideration to herself is void against 
public policy.”67  However, the court held that such contracts were 
proper where “the monetary consideration is to flow to the child.”68  
Somehow, the hospital expenses associated with childbirth were then 
characterized by the court as not only benefiting the child but also as “in 
no way inured to the benefit of the natural mother.”69  Thus, the Court 
was able to conclude that the contract in question was valid, despite the 
ban on exchanging monetary consideration for consent to adoption, 
because none of the monetary consideration benefited the mother.70   
Gorden is apparently unusual in its willingness to require birth 
parents to reimburse medical expenses to disappointed prospective 
adoptive parents.  Gorden is also somewhat unusual in its 
straightforward acknowledgement and acceptance of a contract in which 
financial benefit is exchanged for consent to adoption.  Gorden’s 
conclusion that the mother does not financially benefit when childbirth 
expenses are paid is so incredible that it must be accounted as a mere 
legal fiction.  First, no one could miss the fact that hospital and medical 
charges for childbirth include fees for medical care of the mother, as well 
as the child.  Second, it obviously benefits parents when someone pays 
the medical expenses of their children, since parents are legally 
responsible to pay their children’s medical expenses.  Thus, the court 
employed a legal fiction to validate a contract involving the exchange of 
financial benefit to the mother, in exchange for the mother’s consent to 
the adoption.  The court in Gorden refused to indulge in the more 
common legal fiction that medical expenses provided to birth mothers by 
prospective adoptive parents are mere “gifts”; instead, it employed the 
even more ludicrous fiction that the payment of pregnancy and 
childbirth expenses is not a financial benefit to the birth mother.  The 
court’s choice of a more unusual legal fiction was apparently motivated 
by a desire to see the prospective adoptive parents reimbursed, a result 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 452-59. 
67 Id. at 458. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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that could not be obtained by calling their provision of medical expenses 
a “gift.” 
The confusion of the courts is illustrated by subsequent cases in 
Pennsylvania that cite Gorden for the proposition that the state has a 
strong public policy against selling children.  Thus, in justifying the 
judicial reduction of intermediary adoption fees, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court invoked the memory of slavery and the civil war, and 
then lamented: 
By now the practice should be so abhorrent to every 
American that no one would traffic in human life for 
profit.  Unfortunately, the lessons of the past are already 
forgotten; and due to the current small supply of babies 
available for adoption relative to the demand for those 
infants by prospective parents who are ready to pay, if 
they must, to get an infant, our society has experienced a 
degree of principle-shifting.71 
In support of these brave words, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
then cited Gorden for the proposition that contracts contrary to public 
policy would not be enforced,72 apparently oblivious to that decision’s 
use of a legal fiction to enforce a contract exchanging money for the birth 
parents’ consent to adoption.   
The difficulties of the legal system in defining and enforcing the 
principle against selling children has been accentuated by the emergence 
of various alternative reproductive technologies, including, particularly, 
various forms of surrogacy.  The question of whether surrogacy contracts 
should be evaluated under the principles of adoption statutes 
prohibiting baby-selling has received a variety of answers.  Although the 
better and more common answer would appear to be that surrogacy for 
a fee is illegal, the answer is not universal, as it varies according to 
whether the “surrogate” mother is the genetic mother and still leaves 
room for providing generous “expenses.”73  The net result is a booming 
                                                 
71 In re Adoption of B.A.B.,  534 A.2d 1050, 1052 (Pa. 1987). 
72 See id. 
73 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding that a gestational surrogate 
mother is not a mother under California law, and therefore gestational surrogacy contracts 
are not subject to adoption statutes and do not violate public policy); MARTHA A. FIELD, 
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1990); Ann M. Haralambie, Handling Child Custody, in 1 ABUSE 
AND ADOPTION CASES §§ 9.13–.18 (1993 & Supp. 2003); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Approaching 
Surrogate Motherhood:  Reconsidering Difference, 26 VT. L. REV. 407 (2002). 
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business in surrogacy, which as advertised on the internet involves very 
substantive payments to “surrogate” mothers and can prove more 
expensive than even a high-end conventional adoption.74   
Given all of the confusion regarding the current role of money in 
domestic infant adoption, it should not be surprising that one author, a 
psychologist and adoptive parent specializing in adoption and family 
issues, finally concluded that “black market adoptions are not much 
different from our current adoption practices.”75  Based on this 
conclusion, this popular guide to adoption proposed that the black 
market be legalized, to “allow the mother and those involved with 
arranging adoptions to make a profit.”76  Similarly, although Judge 
Posner’s proposal for creating an infant adoption77 has become 
notorious, he plausibly defended his proposal by arguing that he was 
merely proposing to make the existing legal “market in babies” more 
efficient and equitable.  Thus, Judge Posner argued that the “element of a 
sale” exists in private agency adoptions due to the provision of expenses 
to the birth mother, and is “even more transparent” in independent 
adoptions.78  Although it would be possible to allow for the provision of 
birth parent expenses in a way that was clearly different from Judge 
Posner’s proposal that birth mothers sell their parental rights to the 
highest bidder, within our current law and practice it is not always easy 
to discern the difference. 
2. Money and Birth Parents in the Intercountry Adoption System  
The ethical and legal paradoxes of the domestic adoption system 
within the United States create an unstable baseline for evaluating when 
intercountry adoption has descended into trafficking or the sale of 
children.  This uncertain baseline causes many to come to intercountry 
adoption, believing that it is normal to pay birth mothers large amounts 
of money, and with a hazy sense as to when such financial provision 
becomes illicit.  Thus, one reporter investigating a major baby-buying 
                                                 
74 See, e.g., Surrogate Alternatives, Inc., at http://www.surrogatealternatives.com/fees. 
htm (last visited Oct 29, 2004); Center for Surrogate Parenting, Inc., at 
http://www.creatingfamilies.com/Costai.HTML (last visited October 29, 2004). 
75 MARTIN & GROVES, supra note 53, at 162.  The statement was apparently not meant as a 
condemnation of the current system, but rather as a part of an argument for legalizing the 
black market.  Id. at 162-70. 
76 Id. at 167. 
77 The original proposal is found in Elizabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The 
Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUDIES 323, 347 (1978). 
78 See Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59, 60 
(1987). 
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scandal in Cambodia found that some minimized the concern over 
payments made to Cambodian birthmothers, by pointing out that 
“privately arranged adoptions in the United States often require 
adoptive parents to pay a birth mother’s medical and living expenses, up 
to tens of thousands of dollars, during and after pregnancy.”  Under this 
line of reasoning, some maintained that it should be legitimate to give a 
poor birth parent in Cambodia “some money so that she can properly 
look after the rest of her family.”79 
This lack of a clear domestic adoption baseline is unfortunate, 
because the financial aspects of intercountry adoption involve distinctive 
and troubling ethical dilemmas.  Indeed, in nations where poverty is 
often an inducing factor in relinquishments, the entire question of money 
is a quagmire.   
The first issue is whether financial assistance toward keeping the 
family together must be offered prior to accepting a relinquishment.  
Given that many birth mothers will be among the segment of humanity 
living on less than  two dollars per day—and some among those living 
on less than  one dollar per day—it could be argued that relatively small 
amounts of money might help keep the child with the birth family.80  
Indeed, it may be that the travel expenses involved in an intercountry 
adoption would be more than sufficient to avoid relinquishment, if such 
a sum were available to assist the birth family rather than to remove the 
child.  Thus, it could be argued that consent to intercountry adoption 
should only be considered valid where financial assistance to keep the 
child with the birth family was offered and available.  As an ethical 
matter, it is perverse to spend thousands of dollars taking a child from 
the birth family, when a much smaller sum would have kept the family 
intact.   
Neither the OP-CRC nor the Hague Convention, however, require 
the offer or availability of such financial assistance to birth families to 
validate consent to adoption.  It is legal to accept the relinquishment of a 
child for purposes of intercountry adoption even where the provision of 
                                                 
79 See Sara Corbett,  Where Do Babies Come FROM?, N.Y TIMES, June 16, 2002, at 42. 
80 For commentary on the role of poverty in contributing to relinquishments in various 
nations, see generally Smolin, supra note 10 (India); see also Corbett, supra note 79 
(Cambodia); Robin McDowell, Cambodian Babies Still Sold for Adoption, BIRMINGHAM NEWS,  
March 7, 2004, at 6A (Cambodia); Robin McDowell, Poor Cambodians Selling Babies, THE 
TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), March 7, 2004, at A10 [hereinafter McDowell, Poor Cambodians] 
(Cambodia); Report on the Mission to Guatemala, supra note 36 (Guatemala). 
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a very modest sum of assistance would have kept the child with the birth 
family. 
From a legal perspective, therefore, the financial issues related to 
relinquishment only arise when birth parents receive some kind of 
money or assistance.  Under the combined standards of the OP-CRC and 
the Hague Convention, any amount of remuneration or consideration 
that “induces” consent to adoption is sufficient to constitute child selling.  
This rule is important, particularly given reports of birth families being 
induced to relinquish children for as little as twenty dollars.81  When 
such small sums actually are “inducements,” however, proof and 
enforcement issues become difficult.  Even if it is possible to document 
the receipt of money and corollary relinquishment by a birth parent—a 
difficult matter, when such small sums are involved, and intermediaries 
to send and receive are available—the distinction between assistance and 
inducement can be difficult to define.  Given a poverty-stricken birth 
parent, the failure to provide some small amount of assistance would 
seem itself a cruelty, and yet once such assistance is given it can be 
difficult to tell whether it served as an inducement.82   
Unfortunately, the international rules governing consent to adoption 
are not prophylactic, in that they permit situations where inducement is 
likely.  For example, the international rules apparently allow aid to be 
offered only to those birth parents who relinquish their children, rather 
than requiring aid to birth parents to be unconditional.  Thus, the 
international rules permit patterns of aid that create incentives to 
relinquish.  It is only an actual inducement that is apparently illegal.  The 
difficulty with this rule is that proof of an inducement, or a quid pro quo, 
ultimately turns on the inner motivations and understanding of the 
parties.  Because birth parents frequently will not be cooperative with 
investigative authorities, given their own legal, social, and financial 
vulnerabilities, proof of inducement will often be difficult even where 
                                                 
81 See McDowell, Poor Cambodians, supra note 80 (noting that Cambodian birth mothers 
received as little as twenty dollars from intermediaries); Smolin, supra note 10 (citing T. 
Sunil Reddy, Rescued Children Fight Diseases, Face a Future of Uncertainty, INDIA EXPRESS, 
April 4, 1999, at 1) (noting birth parents in India are paid as little as  fifteen dollars by 
intermediaries). 
82 See Ethica, Child Trafficking:  Why Can’t the Immigration Service Prove It?, (June 6, 2003), 
available at http://www.ethicanet.org/INEvidence.PDF [hereinafter Ethica] (reviewing 
specific U.S. government investigations of alleged child trafficking in intercountry 
adoption).  Ethica is an organization that advocates for ethical adoption.  This author has 
been on advisory boards of this organization but had no role in creating the article cited 
herein. 
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children were in fact sold.  If the “buyer and seller” (agency and birth 
parent) maintain their story that no sale occurred but that the consent to 
adoption and provision of assistance were each independent acts, proof 
of inducement becomes extraordinarily difficult even where receipt of 
money is proven.83 
Indeed, under the official U.S. interpretation of the OP-CRC, proof of 
a willful and knowing intent to induce consent through compensation is 
required to constitute a violation of the OP-CRC’s ban on the illicit sale 
of children.84  Under this interpretation, an adoption may be lawful 
under the OP-CRC even if the provision of money to a birth parent 
actually induced relinquishment.  It is not enough to prove that the birth 
parents thought they were selling their baby; one must also prove that 
those receiving the child willfully and knowingly purchased the child.  
Thus, a well-intentioned system of assistance to relinquishing birth 
parents that inadvertently induces consent does not constitute the illicit 
sale of children. 
Intercountry adoption largely mirrors the ethical dilemmas of 
domestic adoption in which financial consideration inducing consent to 
adoption is condemned, but non-inducing “gifts” of assistance, even 
directed only to relinquishing birth parents, are apparently permissible.85  
The issue is aggravated in intercountry adoption by the extreme poverty 
of many birth parents in developing nations that face a severe struggle to 
obtain the very barest necessities of food, water, clothing, and shelter for 
themselves and their children.  Under these circumstances, it becomes 
much more likely that the possibility of a small “gift” could in fact 
induce relinquishment.86  Indeed, in some developing nation contexts a 
“gift” of one hundred dollars might be more likely to “induce” consent 
to adoption than would a “gift” of fifty-thousand dollars within the 
United States.  Thus, a systematic program of assistance for birth parents, 
where aid was conditioned on relinquishment, would be likely to have 
the effect of inducing relinquishments in a significant percentage of 
cases.  The conclusion that inadvertent child buying does not constitute 
                                                 
83 See id. 
84 See Ratification OP-CRC, supra note 47, at art. 3 (noting that the United States 
understands that the term “improperly inducing consent” in Article 3(1)(a)(ii) of the 
Protocol means knowingly and willfully inducing consent by offering or giving 
compensation for the relinquishment of parental rights). 
85 Ethica, supra note 82 (noting that the Foreign Affairs Manual, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
MANUAL 42.21 N13.7, states that investigating officers “must take into account the fact that 
some payment of expenses is allowed under the law”). 
86 See supra note 80. 
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an illicit “sale of children” would leave the door wide open to abusive 
adoption practices, making enforcement of the norm against child selling 
all but illusory.  
Despite these difficulties, some violators of the ban on buying infants 
act so flagrantly and notoriously that enforcement should be possible.  
Thus, as adoption intermediaries systematically make it known among 
birth parents that they are in the market for buying children, and 
themselves employ or rely on further intermediaries, the quid pro quo 
aspects of intentionally paying money for children becomes 
unmistakable.  Even then, however, it may be difficult to prove the sale 
of a child in each individual case, at least so long as the birth parents fail 
to admit that they “sold” their baby.87   
The intercountry adoption system should create a rule forbidding all 
assistance to birth parents that is conditioned on relinquishment or 
placement of the child.  This kind of prophylactic rule would clarify, to 
some degree, the critical distinction between assistance and buying 
children.  There is precedent for such a rule within the domestic 
adoption system, although the international ban would have to be 
broader and clearer than the domestic ban to be effective.  Until the 
international adoption system adopts such a rule, it will be difficult to 
prevent both notorious and inadvertent inducement to relinquish. 
In the longer term, the intercountry adoption system should require 
that birth parents be offered some degree of financial help to keep the 
child with the family.  Under this rule, a relinquishment or consent to 
adoption by a birth parent to a licensed agency would only be valid 
within the intercountry adoption system if the birth parents had been 
offered a certain measure of financial assistance to keep the family intact.  
The amount offered could be relatively modest—for example, 
approximately one hundred U.S. dollars for adoptions in nations like 
India, Cambodia, and Guatemala, where relinquishing parents often 
earn less than  two dollars per day.  The funds would come from 
intercountry adoption fees.   
Such a rule could help rebut the charge that intercountry adoption 
between rich and poor countries exploits the economic vulnerability of 
                                                 
87 Thus, in the Andhra Pradesh, India, Guatemala, and Cambodian adoption scandals, 
many concluded that baby-selling was occurring, and shutdowns or moratoriums 
sometimes have occurred, but it was still rare to find any individual cases in which a court 
found that a particular infant had been illicitly purchased. 
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the poor in order to meet the desire of the rich for children.  While a rule 
requiring modest assistance toward keeping the family intact would not 
entirely rebut this charge, it would reduce the instances where the 
children were relinquished solely for financial reasons.  Without such a 
rule, the intercountry adoption system would continue to permit the 
cruel practice of spending tens of thousands of dollars to take a child 
from his birth parents, while being unwilling to provide any assistance, 
not a single dollar, to help the child remain with his parents. 
D.  Money and Intermediaries 
Where the birth parents’ consent to adoption is illicit in a non-
financial way, for example through coercion, fraud, or 
misrepresentation, the adoption violates the standards of the Hague 
Convention.88  Such a violation of the Hague Convention, however, is 
insufficient in itself to render the adoption an illicit “sale of children” 
under the OP-CRC standards because it does not constitute the sale of a 
child.89  However, if such a wrongful taking of a child through non-
financial means is followed by the subsequent transfer of the child for 
“remuneration or any other consideration,” then under the OP-CRC the 
adoption would constitute an illicit “sale of a child.”90  We might call 
such a subsequent transfer of the child a “downstream sale,” because the 
sale occurs after the child has already been (wrongfully) taken from the 
birth parents.   
This question of a “downstream sale” of a child requires inquiry into 
the quagmire of money and adoption intermediaries.  Commonly, 
adoption intermediaries are both paid and they transfer the child.  The 
difficulty therefore becomes determining when these two related events 
constitute the “transfer” of a child for “remuneration or any other 
consideration,” as described in the OP-CRC. 
Once again, the domestic adoption system creates a problematic 
point of comparison.  Despite the concern within the domestic adoption 
system of profiteering by adoption intermediaries, it has been 
permissible for such intermediaries to receive substantial payments.  The 
theory of such payments appears to vary with the kind of intermediary, 
but the common theme is that intermediaries may be paid reasonable 
and customary fees for services provided.  Permissible services include 
                                                 
88 See Hague Convention, supra note 29 . 
89 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
90 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. 
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counseling, home studies, social and medical histories, and attorney fees.  
Payment for obtaining a consent to adoption or placement of a child is 
generally forbidden.91  These rules are designed to ensure that 
placements are made in the best interests of children, rather than made 
through a market process in which children are allocated to the highest 
bidder regardless of the appropriateness of the adoption.   
The context for these payments for “services” is a domestic system 
for infant adoption dominated by private agencies and intermediaries.  
Public agencies primarily place older children who have come into state 
custody through allegations of abuse or neglect.  These private agencies 
and intermediaries have created a diverse and somewhat entrepreneurial 
environment, which includes religious and social service agencies 
broadly involved in human services, as well as entities and persons 
specialized in adoption.  The competitive environment for these entities 
can be difficult, since entry into the field appears  wide-open.  While the 
persons working in the field include social workers and lawyers, 
professional credentials are not required, and the most critical attribute 
may be the capacity to find or attract birth parents.92   
Domestic adoption within the United States has been radically 
altered by the relative empowerment of birth parents of healthy infants.  
Since more than ninety-five percent of single birth parents either abort or 
keep the child, and only a small percentage offer the child for adoption, 
birth parents find themselves courted by agencies, intermediaries, and 
prospective adoptive parents.  Large numbers of prospective adoptive 
parents seek a much smaller number of available infants through 
advertisements to birth parents.  These advertisements offer birth 
parents free counseling, financial assistance, college scholarships, 
detailed information on prospective adoptive families, and open 
adoption.  In addition, the reduction of social stigma for single 
parenthood has further empowered birth parents, making the option of 
keeping their baby or openly interviewing prospective adoptive parents 
generally available.  Under these circumstances, birth parents are no 
longer limited to a shame-faced relinquishment of their child to an all-
powerful intermediary.  While this empowerment of the birth family 
opens the door to certain kinds of abuse—principally related to a 
bidding war for scarce babies—it reduces to some degree the capacity of 
                                                 
91 See NAIC  Adoption Expenses, supra note 53. 
92 See Pierce & Vitillo, supra note 58, at 131; Evan B. Donaldson Institute, Private Domestic 
Adoption Facts, available at https://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview/domestic_ 
print.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Evan B. Donaldson Institute]. 
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intermediaries to use the cloaks of privacy and power to profiteer for 
themselves.  On the other hand, the empowerment of birth parents 
means that intermediaries who can attract birth parents will tend to 
dominate, regardless of professional competencies or official 
credentials.93 
The intercountry adoption system is similarly dominated by private 
intermediaries, but here the picture becomes even more complex.  Unlike 
domestic adoption, where the capacity to find birth parents as clients is 
critical, the most significant client for intercountry adoption is the 
adoptive family.  Thus, whereas domestic infant adoption 
advertisements are aimed at birth parents, in intercountry adoption the 
ads are aimed at adoptive families.  Agencies tout their capacity to 
reliably and quickly deliver healthy infants to adoptive parents:  “Want a 
baby?—we’ll get you a healthy Guatemalan infant in less than a year!”  
Clients weary of chasing picky birth parents within the domestic system, 
put off by the specter of birth parents changing their minds before or 
after birth, and ambivalent about open adoption, are lured into the 
international system by the comparative powerlessness and distance of 
foreign birth parents.  Well-meaning families who already have children 
are drawn into intercountry adoption by the plea to provide homes for 
the destitute orphans of the world that are presented as being virtually 
limitless in number.  The regulatory environment for intermediaries 
working in intercountry adoption varies significantly from state to state, 
but can be summarized, overall, as quite lax, making professional 
credentials optional.   
In intercountry adoption, as in domestic adoption, the theory is that 
adoptive parents are paying for “services,” and perhaps “gifts” to others, 
but they are not buying a child.  The nature of those “services” and 
“gifts” within intercountry adoption remains quite obscure, however, 
due to the vague breakdown of intercountry adoption fees.  Intercountry 
adoption can be quite expensive, but it is not always clear exactly where 
the money is going.  Fees are often broadly designated as “agency fees,” 
“international fees,” or fees going to those within the foreign nation (i.e., 
“India Fee”).  In many intercountry adoptions, all of the fees are paid by 
the adoptive parents to the U.S. placement entity, which then channels 
portions to various entities and persons within the sending nation.  In 
some countries, the adoptive parents are required to bring significant 
                                                 
93 See generally CARP, FAMILY MATTERS, supra note 6, at 196-222 (discussing the 
development of open adoption); PERTMAN, supra note 5 (discussing general changes in 
adoption); Evan B. Donaldson Institute, supra note 92 (discussing attracting birth parents). 
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amounts of cash with them into the foreign nation, and pay various 
entities directly.  In either event, it is common for five thousand dollars 
to ten-thousand dollars per child to be paid to various individuals, 
agencies, and entities within the foreign nation.  When this kind of 
money goes to nations with per capita incomes of less than one thousand 
dollars, often less than five hundred dollars, it becomes extraordinarily 
difficult to prevent adoption from descending into a form of child 
trafficking.  I have elsewhere described at great length how the Indian 
adoption system has been corrupted by large amounts of American 
dollars, but doubtless the story could be repeated in the various nations 
plagued by adoption scandals.94 
The various entities and individuals involved in intercountry 
adoption, who may receive fees, include (1) U.S. placement agencies; (2) 
U.S. agencies providing home study of adoptive family; (3) orphanages 
or agencies in the foreign country with custody of child; (4) various 
“facilitators,” employees of United States or foreign agencies, who move 
adoptions through the foreign system; (5) attorneys in foreign nations; 
(6) possible “foster parents” in foreign countries; (7) medical 
professionals providing medical evaluations of children; and (8) social 
workers providing social histories or child study forms.  Of course there 
are also various official immigration and court fees, in addition to travel 
costs, which add to the cost of intercountry adoption, but generally 
provide far less room for mischief.        
As a practical matter, the U.S. practice of spending five thousand 
dollars to ten-thousand dollars per child in the foreign countries 
generally creates a large “profit” or excess beyond any actual, legitimate 
costs related to adoption services.  Indeed, in nations where social 
workers traditionally earn a few thousand dollars per year, and 
orphanage workers can be paid a few dollars a day or less, it seems 
probable that the vast bulk of the fees are sheer profits.  The ultimate 
destinations of these profits seem to vary from nation to nation.  Some 
argue that the Chinese, with their centralized systems of control, have 
successfully used most of their adoption fees to significantly improve 
their orphanages and services for abandoned children, most of whom 
will remain in China.95  By contrast, in Guatemala, India, and Cambodia, 
                                                 
94 See  Smolin, supra note 10. 
95 See KAY ANN JOHNSON, WANTING A DAUGHTER, NEEDING A SON:  ABANDONMENT, 
ADOPTION, AND ORPHANAGE CARE IN CHINA 183-211 (Amy Klatzkin ed., 2004). 
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it appears that the exorbitant fees have enriched individual 
intermediaries.96   
The Hague Convention specifically requires contracting States to 
take “all appropriate measures to prevent improper financial or other 
gain in connection with an adoption . . . .”97  But what is “improper” 
gain?  The best definition would include compensation disproportionate 
to services rendered, based on the Hague Convention’s prohibition of 
remuneration that “is unreasonably high in relation to services 
rendered.”98  For example, if an individual in a developing nation spends 
ten hours working on an adoption, and a person in his field (social work, 
child welfare, law, etc.) would normally receive two hundred dollars for 
such work, then receipt of three thousand dollars beyond expenses 
should count as “improper” gain.   
One difficulty with enforcing such a norm is that the foreign 
agencies and individuals receiving “adoption fees” often claim that those 
sums are funding an orphanage, including the costs of caring for 
children who will never be adopted.  In many instances there does not 
seem to be a clear system of accountability to determine the degree to 
which such fees are truly spent on child welfare or are simply to enrich 
individuals.  In those circumstances, it becomes very difficult to 
document whether the “profit” is used to fund the operation of the 
orphanage or is pocketed by the individual.99 
Even if the amounts paid to particular individuals are 
disproportionately high, and within the Hague Convention’s  
prohibition of “improper financial gain,” they are not necessarily within 
the OP-CRC definition of a sale of a child.  In order to come within the 
definition of a “sale” of a child, there must be the following two elements 
beyond the receipt of some consideration:  (1) transferring the child; and 
(2) in exchange for, or in consideration for, the receipt of consideration.  
The first element is met only when the individual at some point had 
physical or legal custody of the child.  Even where that element is met, 
however, the element of exchange of the child for money is problematic.   
Consider a typical situation where a corrupt individual (“Mr. K.”) in 
a sending nation obtains physical custody of a child in some non-
                                                 
96 See note 79. 
97 Hague Convention, supra note  29, at art. 8. 
98 See id. at art. 32(3). 
99 See Smolin, supra note 10  (discussing issue of orphanage donations and fees in context 
of India). 
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financial illicit manner, such as tricking or coercing the birth parents.  
The child is living in an orphanage controlled by Mr. K.  Assume that 
legitimate adoption agencies in the United States regularly obtain 
children from Mr. K’s orphanage, paying him a four thousand dollar per 
child “foreign fee.”  This money comes from the adoptive families, who 
pay the money to the U.S. agency.  The U.S. agency pays Mr. K. half of 
the money upon some initial stage of the adoption, and the other half 
when the child arrives in the United States.  Although the complete and 
specific purposes of the fees are not delineated, the fees do cover the care 
of the child while in the orphanage, necessary medical and social 
examinations and reports, attorney and court fees, general assistance to 
the orphanage, and the shepherding of the adoption through an intricate, 
and somewhat corrupt, adoption process.  While unstated, it is 
understood that some portion of the fees may be used, as needed, for the 
payment of bribes, which are often necessary even to complete a 
legitimate adoption of a true orphan.  Moreover, assume that the U.S. 
agency has no knowledge of the illicit relinquishment and that the fees 
are handled in exactly the same way when children were properly 
relinquished by their parents.  Finally, Mr. K. in practice generally 
pockets, personally, approximately sixty percent or twenty-four hundred 
dollars of the four thousand dollar fee, even though he actually spends 
no more than ten hours time working on the adoption, and his normal 
salary for a year’s work outside the adoption field would be eight 
thousand dollars.   
In this hypothetical,100 it is arguable whether the element of quid pro 
quo, involving the exchange of financial gain for transfer of the child, is 
present.  On the one hand, this situation could be seen as a matter of 
payment for services—or more precisely, gross overpayment for 
services.  While overpayment for services can be seen as violating norms 
against profiteering or improper financial gain, such a violation does not 
necessarily turn an adoption into a sale of a child.  Indeed, Mr. K. can 
plausibly argue that since he was paid for services rendered he is not 
liable for selling children. 
On the other hand, it would be possible to argue that the 
combination of illicit taking of the child from his parents and 
                                                 
100 I would stress that Mr. K. does not refer to any particular person, but rather is meant 
to describe an unfortunately typical example of a somewhat corrupt adoption orphanage 
director in a sending country.  The choice of the letter “K” is meant as an allusion to 
Kafka’s work.  Of course I do not think that such persons are innocent victims of an 
absurdist bureaucracy; here, the sources of absurdity have to be found elsewhere. 
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profiteering or improper financial gain make this into an implicit sale of 
a child.  Such an argument depends on a kind of non-technical, yet 
realistic conclusion that Mr. K. is in the business of obtaining children 
and then selling them for a handsome profit.  But how can Mr. K be a 
seller of children, without labeling the U.S. adoption agency and 
adoptive parents as buyers, even if unwitting buyers?    
The difficulty of drawing the line between a service contract and the 
sale of a child should not obscure the clear cases.  It is reported that in 
India, orphanages were paying “scouts” or intermediaries for children.  
The intermediaries that bought a newborn for  twenty dollars from an 
impoverished birth family and then transferred the child to the 
orphanage for two hundred dollars certainly seem to have been involved 
in child selling, child trafficking, and the downstream “sale of a child.”  
Ironically, however, even such scouts could claim that they were being 
paid for the “service” of finding needy children in danger of infanticide 
and in need of adoption and hence were not really “selling” or 
transferring the child.101 Hopefully no one would “buy” this argument, 
but in a strictly logical sense, the line between being paid for the 
“service” of finding children, and being paid for the child, is more or less 
arbitrary. 
Another clear instance of intermediaries selling children in 
intercountry adoption occurs when orphanages, which have either 
legitimately or illegitimately obtained custody of children, choose the 
adoptive parent and U.S. placement agency based on a “highest bidder” 
methodology.  For example, an orphanage director may let it be known 
that he will place infants through the U.S. agency that provides the 
highest adoption fee.  Such a situation is compounded by the custom of 
some U.S. intercountry adoption agencies of compensating “country 
coordinators” by paying a sum per completed adoption.  This 
arrangement, of course, looks suspiciously like a sales commission.  If 
the U.S. intermediary is paid, for example, three thousand dollars per 
completed adoption—perhaps half of the agency fee—it may be 
tempting for that individual to “kick back” a certain percentage of his fee 
to the foreign country director in exchange for quick access to the most 
adoptable children.  As the foreign orphanage and various U.S. 
orphanages negotiate these kinds of arrangements, they are in fact 
exchanging money in consideration of the transfer of the child, a classic 
form of downstream child-selling.  Yet, it is possible to theoretically and 
                                                 
101 See Smolin, supra note 10 (describing adoption scandal in Andhra Pradesh, India). 
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practically disguise these kinds of transactions as merely standard “fees” 
for services exchanged, with even “highest bidder” tactics justified as 
attempts to fund the orphanage or demand higher quality service.   
III.  CONCLUSION:  INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION AS CHILD TRAFFICKING 
As the above analysis demonstrates, the fundamental legal 
distinction between a legitimate adoption and the illicit sale of a child is 
unclear in both theory and practice.  The distinction is maintained by a 
logically arbitrary system of labeling under which exchanges involving 
money are classified as legitimate or illegitimate.  This labeling system 
unfortunately appears quite illusory because the distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate is maintained by applying conclusory legal 
labels without a clear relationship to the actual nature of the underlying 
transaction.  Thus, the domestic system of adoption generally labels 
financial benefits provided to the birth parent, and the birth parent’s 
consent to adoption, as unrelated “gift” and “consent.”  This labeling is 
applied even where it is clear that the financial assistance is induced by 
the representation that the birth parent currently intends to place the 
child with those providing the “gift.”  The law deliberately obscures the 
true nature of the transaction through labels like “gift” to theoretically 
maintain the rule against selling children.  Similarly, the system 
maintains the illusion that intermediaries are being paid for “services,” 
rather than for the child, even when the payments are contingent on 
successful delivery of the child or differ according to the characteristics 
of the child, rather than according to the services rendered. 
This terminological sleight of hand can be played to the point where 
child selling can be explicitly defended.  The best illustration of this is the 
famous (or infamous) defense of child selling by Judge Richard Posner, 
who argued that the law should permit birth parents to sell their infants 
to adoptive families. Judge Posner defended his proposal by claiming 
that it did not really amount to “baby selling” since it was merely 
custodial rights, rather than children, that would be sold.  From Judge 
Posner’s perspective, so long as children are not reduced to the status of 
slaves, they are not being sold.  Hence, Judge Posner responded to the 
criticism that his proposal commodified human beings, or undermined 
the ban against slavery, by stating that his critics were really confused by 
the “mis-use” of the term “baby selling.”  Once one used the proper term 
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of “sale of parental rights,” all such moral objections should disappear, 
according to Judge Posner.102 
One could summarize the word games and arbitrary distinctions of 
both Judge Posner, and our legal system, as follows: 
 Prohibited Permitted 
Judge Posner Sale of children (as slaves) Sale of parental or 
custodial rights 
Current law Sale of children, parental, 
or custodial rights 
“Gifts” to birth parents 
Birth parent “expenses” 
Payment for “services” 
 
My argument is that the law’s distinction between illicit sale of 
children (or parental rights) and licit “gifts,” “expenses,” and “services” 
is just as illusory as Judge Posner’s distinction between illicit sale of 
children and licit sale of parental rights.  Just as Judge Posner’s proposal 
to permit the sale of parental rights would render a prohibition of baby-
selling illusory, the law’s current permission of “gifts,” “expenses,” and 
“services” makes the law’s prohibition of selling parental rights and 
children largely illusory. 
I am not arguing that gifts to birth parents, birth parent expenses, or 
adoption service fees, are in themselves necessarily unethical or  
tantamount to baby selling.  However, the context in which the law 
permits these activities renders them questionable and allows children to 
be commercialized and commodified.  Thus, in the context of 
intercountry adoption, it is illusory to distinguish between buying 
children, and paying for adoption services, when the law has no effective 
system of preventing adoption intermediaries from profiteering from 
adoption.   
Where the law permits orphanages to become profit centers 
generating wealth far beyond normal compensation for services, the 
concept of “payment for services” is a legal fiction ineffectively hiding a 
commercial trade in children.  Where the law permits adoptive parents 
to be charged for “orphanage donations,” but has no effective means of 
ensuring that these funds are spent on children, rather than being 
pocketed by intermediaries, “donations” become a legal fiction 
facilitating a trade in children.  Similarly, the distinction between gifts to 
birth parents and illicitly inducing consent through financial 
                                                 
102 See RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 409-17 (1992). 
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consideration has little meaning in an intercountry adoption system in 
which aid to assist birth families to stay together is not required and in 
which it is permissible to offer aid only to birth parents who consent to 
adoption.   
Thus, where parents give up their children for the lack of a few 
hundred dollars, or less, but the intercountry adoption system spends 
tens of thousands of dollars completing the adoption of the child, the 
concept of compassionate adoption becomes a cruel hoax.  Moreover, 
where impoverished parents in developing nations are offered financial 
assistance only when they relinquish their children, and the law 
considers this a licit “gift” unless agency and parent virtually confess to 
intending a sale, as a result a ban on child selling becomes illusory.  
Similarly, within the domestic system the concept of paying for services, 
but not for children, becomes illusory when agencies charge far more for 
high-demand white infants, evidencing the development of a market in 
children.  The willingness of the law to label such an obvious sign of a 
market as a mere “payment of permissible services” indicates that the 
adoption system is mired in legal fictions with little relationship to the 
underlying commodification of children. 
Thus, adoption can only maintain a principled and enforceable line 
against child selling and child trafficking when effective systems of 
enforceable regulation are in place that effectively prevent adoption 
systems from becoming markets in children.  The refusal or failure of the 
domestic and intercountry adoption systems to put those needed 
regulations into place speaks volumes regarding the ethics of the 
domestic and intercountry adoption systems.103  Unfortunately, upon 
closer examination it appears that the ethics of the adoption systems, 
both domestic and intercountry, are just as illusory and fictional as the 
legal prohibitions on child-selling.   
If my argument is correct, then those who label intercountry 
adoption as a form of child trafficking are largely correct, at least under 
current circumstances and contexts.  Intercountry adoption is a form of 
child trafficking not because adoptive families in rich countries obtain 
poor children from developing and transition economy nations.  Rather, 
                                                 
103 My comments on the system of domestic adoption pertain only to the placement of 
healthy infants.  The domestic system for placing abused and neglected children from the 
foster care system, or special needs children generally, is quite different and is not 
addressed in this article. 
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intercountry adoption is a form of child trafficking because the law and 
current systems of intercountry adoption permit it to operate as such.   
I am not arguing that every individual adoption in the current 
intercountry adoption system constitutes the illicit sale of a child or illicit 
child trafficking.  I am confident that there are many intercountry 
adoptions that are ethical, where money has not played any improper or 
illicit role.  Moreover, some of the most important sending nations are 
free of significant child trafficking within their adoption systems.  
However, the system as a whole is corrupt because it has no effective 
means of preventing intercountry adoption from degenerating into illicit 
child trafficking.  This legal failure, moreover, is not merely a theoretical 
difficulty.  According to one estimate, over forty percent of significant 
sending nations over the last fifteen years have been shut down due 
primarily to adoption scandals concerning corruption and child 
trafficking.104  This estimate, moreover, does not include nations, such as 
India, that have been plagued by significant adoption scandals but have 
not experienced a nation-wide shutdown or moratorium.  The gaps in 
the law, therefore, are accompanied by recurrent and systematic baby-
selling scandals.  Moreover, these abusive adoption practices are not new 
but have been going on for decades.105  The problems with intercountry 
adoption and child trafficking are systematic and recurrent, not 
exceptional or occasional. 
                                                 
104 See Ethica, Intercountry Adoption Reform Act (ICARE); Suggested Amendments and 
Comments on Suggested Language, (July 13, 2004), available at https://www.ethicanet.org/ 
ICAREcomments.pdf.  The report notes: 
Over the last 15 years, 40 different countries were in the Top 20 
Countries of Origin for U.S. Families.  Of these, 13 are currently closed 
or effectively closed.  (By effectively closed, we mean that the number 
of children being adopted has fallen to 26 or less each year including 
orphan petitions filed by immediate relatives or those living in the 
foreign country.  Former numbers ranged from 79 to 1,122 per country, 
with an average of 306). 
 
An additional four countries are closed, reportedly temporarily, to 
investigate concerns or establish new procedures.  Together, these 17 
countries account for 43 percent of the 40 most common countries for 
U.S. citizens to adopt from.  Virtually all of these countries closed due 
to concerns about corruption, child trafficking or abduction. 
Id. 
105 See, e.g., Pierce & Vitillo, supra note 58, at 138-42 (documenting abusive adoption 
practices, some documented from a 1980 book); Carro, supra note 29 (documenting already 
long-standing abusive intercountry adoption practices). 
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Of course, it could be argued that the very nature of intercountry 
adoption, involving a transaction between rich and poor nations, lends 
itself to abuse, and therefore the choice is ultimately between shutting 
down intercountry adoption, or allowing it to continue, in the interests of 
saving children, despite these abuses.  This kind of argument implicitly 
justifies child trafficking in the name of the best interest of the child.  
Such justifications are not of the explicit sort provided by Judge Posner 
but rather of the apologetic, “we just can’t stop it,” variety.  From this 
perspective, child selling in the guise of adoption becomes a kind of vice 
crime, like gambling or prostitution, that the law is helpless to stop and 
that may cause more harm than good to prevent.  It is against this kind 
of argument that the introduction of this Article, as well as my prior 
article on the Indian adoption scandals, are directed.  Child trafficking is 
not a mere “vice” crime that the law may legalize, regulate, or allow to 
operate in the shadows.  Child trafficking is a profound violation of 
human rights that law and society must energetically seek to abolish, 
wherever it may be found and whatever disguises it may adopt.  
Further, as this Article makes clear, the law has in no way exhausted the 
regulatory possibilities for preventing intercountry adoption from 
degenerating into a form of trafficking.  Only when the law has 
energetically implemented the obvious and rational regulatory steps to 
prevent adoption as trafficking can the argument be made that the only 
choices are banning intercountry adoption or permitting trafficking.  
Indeed, it is those supposed advocates of intercountry adoptions who 
resist such regulations and excuse the presence of trafficking in the 
adoption system, who are digging the grave of intercountry adoption. 
Intercountry adoption is a conditional good; intercountry adoption 
as child trafficking is an evil.  Only when the law, society, and 
intercountry adoption system are reformed will the conditions under 
which intercountry adoption can flourish as a good be established.  
Unfortunately, the prospects for such reform are poor because there are 
few within the current intercountry adoption system with the motivation 
to demand it.  Hence, the recurrent cycle of scandal, excuse, and 
ineffective “reform” will probably continue until intercountry adoption 
is finally abolished, with history labeling the entire enterprise as a neo-
colonialist mistake.  It does not have to be this way, but it will take more 
than legal fictions and illusory restrictions on child trafficking to prevent 
the ultimate demise of the intercountry adoption system. 
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